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BUSH V. GORE: REPLY TO FRIEDMAN
RICHARD A. POSNER*
The litigation that followed the election deadlock in Florida last
year and that culminated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v.
Gore1 has triggered an avalanche of scholarly commentary, almost all
highly critical of the decision. Professor Friedman’s article2 is one of
the most scholarly and temperate of the articles that I have read
which criticize the decision.
I appreciate the force of his criticisms of my book,3 which defends
the decision, though not the reasoning by which the majority of the
Court reached it. I will respond to these criticisms in this brief comment, following essentially the order of discussion in his article. The
comment is not self-contained but presupposes familiarity both with
my book and with Friedman’s article.
I want at the outset to dispel any impression which my comment
may create that I consider my position on the merits of Bush v. Gore
“right” and Professor Friedman’s “wrong.” Such terms are inapplicable to the most difficult constitutional cases, of which Bush v. Gore (I
think Friedman agrees) is one. I go no further than to claim that the
decision (not, to repeat, the majority opinion) was reasonable. I also
agree with much of Friedman’s analysis, but will not discuss the areas of agreement.
Friedman puts a great deal of weight on an interpretation of section 2 of the Electoral Count Act4 as barring the appointment by the
state legislature of a slate of presidential electors merely because the
election is deadlocked. This is important because the worst-case scenario that I sketch in my book and that provides the basis for my belief that the Supreme Court’s decision terminating the deadlock was
pragmatically justified pivots on the likelihood that the Florida Legislature would have appointed a Bush slate had the Florida Supreme
Court declared Gore the winner of the Florida popular vote. Section 2
provides that if the popular election (or whatever other mode the
state’s election law may specify for the appointment of the state’s
presidential electors) “fail[s] to make a choice” of electors on election
day (November 7 in 2000), the state legislature may select them.5
* Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, The University of Chicago Law School.
1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2. Richard D. Friedman, Trying to Make Peace with Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 811 (2001).
3. RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (Dennis J. Hutchinson et al. eds., 2001).
4. 3 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
5. Id.
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Friedman is right to point out that uncertainty about what choice
was made is consistent with having made a choice. But what if December 18 (in 2000, the day on which the Electoral College was to
vote—and note that the Constitution requires that all the electoral
votes be cast on the same day6) had rolled around and the winner of
the popular election had not yet been determined? That was a likely
eventuality given the time required to conduct a statewide recount
and to submit the results to judicial review. Would that eventuality,
had it materialized, not have been a failure to choose the state’s electors, since it would mean7 that Florida would not be represented in
the Electoral College? And, if so, wasn’t the state legislature entitled
to appoint, at least tentatively, a slate of electors against the contingency that on December 18 the deadlock would still be unresolved? I
consider this an appropriate interpretation of section 2. Is it the
“right” interpretation? Who knows? But it is sufficiently plausible to
have set the stage for a face-off in Congress on January 6 (the date of
the counting of the electoral votes) on whether the slate appointed by
the legislature or the slate certified by the state’s supreme court was
the legitimate one. And then the worst-case scenario would unfold as
I described it in my book.
Friedman argues that there is no absolute requirement that a
state’s electoral votes, to be counted, must be certified by December
18.8 So the fact that that day arrived with no resolution of the electoral deadlock by the Florida Supreme Court need not have excluded
Florida from participating in the selection of the President by the
Electoral College. But I am not sure what follows from this suggestion. One possibility would be that, on December 18, Florida would
vote the Bush slate on the ground that pending completion of the recount he was the presumptive winner of the popular election. But
suppose that between December 18 and January 6, Gore had been
declared the winner of the Florida popular election. Would Florida
then recast its electoral votes? But the Constitution requires that all
electoral votes be cast the same day. A voter who fails to vote on election day is not allowed to vote later. To skirt this problem, Florida
might ask each slate of electors to vote on December 18, leaving to
Congress the decision which votes to count. But this of course assumes that the deadlock must be resolved by Congress, and that is
precisely the worst-case scenario that I sketch in my book.
So far I have been considering whether Bush v. Gore really did
head off a fight in Congress to determine the next President. Now let
me turn to the question whether, as a matter of doctrine rather than
6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
7. Subject to a qualification discussed shortly.
8. Friedman, supra note 2, at 819-21.

2001]

REPLY TO FRIEDMAN

873

consequences, the Florida Supreme Court violated the “manner directed” clause of Article II. (I agree that it did not violate the equal
protection clause.) I accept Friedman’s test: “[u]nless the principles
applied by the court amount to a clearly implausible construction of
state law as the law stood on Election Day, there should not be an
Article II problem.”9
Friedman attributes to me the view that “a punch-card ballot
without a hole for a single presidential candidate punched cleanly
through, knocking the chad off, does not properly cast a vote for
President.”10 He bases this attribution on a statement in the statistical chapter of my book (chapter 2); it was not intended as a statement of law, and indeed all I said there was that this interpretation
made the best fit with the ordinary meaning of “error in the vote
tabulation,” the relevant statutory phrase.11 My position was and is
that because this is a permissible interpretation, one that does no
violence to the statute, common sense, or precedent,12 its adoption by
the state’s division of elections should, under Florida law, have been
conclusive on the courts. The state’s election statute expressly delegates responsibility for interpretation of the statute to the state election officials; and when an agency given such a responsibility exercises it reasonably, then under normal principles of administrative
law obtaining in Florida as elsewhere that is the end of the judicial
inquiry.13 I thus have no quarrel with Friedman’s statement that under Florida law “[i]f a statute leaves room for a range of reasonable
constructions, then the courts should ordinarily defer to a choice
within that range made by the administrative entity charged with
implementing the statute.”14
Deference to administrative judgment is particularly indicated
where a sensible decision depends on considerations that are likely to
be known better by the administrative officials and staff than by
judges and (what is not quite the same thing) that are difficult to
weigh and compare by the methods of litigation.15 Both conditions
were met here. The question how much time and effort to invest in
trying to recover votes from voter-spoiled ballots, in the context of
looming deadlines for the selection of the state’s Electoral College
9. Friedman, supra note 2, at 841. I don’t see, however, how this squares with his
later statement that “to constitute a violation of Article II it is not enough that the state
supreme court’s decision be wrong, or even obviously wrong and wrongheaded.” Id. at 857
(emphasis added).
10. Id. at 843.
11. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(5) (2000), amended by 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 40, § 42, at 151-52.
12. The last point is the most debatable, and is discussed below.
13. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 100.
14. Friedman, supra note 2, at 851.
15. This too Friedman acknowledges as a principle of Florida law. Id. at 851 nn.15758.
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winner, is not a question that judges have a comparative advantage
in answering. It depends on subquestions such as how trustworthy
the methods for inspecting spoiled ballots for ascertainable voter
choice are, how trustworthy the local election boards that will conduct the inspection are, how long a hand recount will take, how likely
the recount will be to change the outcome of the election, and the
significance to be attached to the clarity and completeness of instructions that the voter was given by the local election boards (that is,
how culpable in the spoilage of the ballot the voter should be
thought). The ascertainment and weighing up of these factors require
a managerial-style judgment in a field (election administration)
which most judges have only fleeting, episodic contact with and no
real expertise in, rather than the resolution of the kind of clean-cut
issue of statutory interpretation or application with which judges are
comfortable.
Moreover, although the interpretation adopted by the state election officials was not compelled by the language of the statute (interpretations rarely are), it was more consistent with that language
than the interpretation adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in its
November 21 decision, which required that all spoiled ballots (or at
least all undervoted ballots) be counted if the voter’s intent could be
ascertained. Remember that the operative statutory language was
“error in the vote tabulation”16; without that, there is no legal basis
for a full hand recount in the protest phase of an election dispute.
Tabulation means counting, and the counting is done by machines,
and if the machines are properly programmed, maintained, and operated, and fail to record a vote only because the ballot was not
marked properly by the voter, it is hard to see the failure to record as
a tabulating error. Professor Friedman’s argument that the real
statutory standard is “clear indication of the intent of the voter,”17
because that is the standard applicable to damaged or defective ballots, is strained. There is a clear distinction between a damaged or
defective ballot on the one hand and a ballot that the voter has
spoiled: namely that the voter is not complicit in the first type of
screw-up. State election officials should be entitled to confine the intent standard to the subset of screw-ups in which the voter is least at
fault. That is precisely the kind of practical, splitting-the-difference
resolution that, in the absence of a clear statutory directive, is best
left to the judgment of the administering agency.
Now if Friedman is correct that, despite all I have said, the Florida Supreme Court had prior to the 2000 election carved out a special
16. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
17. Friedman, supra note 2, at 847 (citing Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1257 (Fla.
2000), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)).
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exception from the normal principles of administrative law for election disputes, that special exception would constitute a valid judicial
gloss on the state election statute. And he is right that there are
cases which indicate that spoiled ballots should be counted as votes if
the voter’s intent is discernible. But he is putting a lot of weight on
dicta. All but two of the cases are ones in which the court was refusing to set aside the result of an election.18 They are realistically
viewed as based not on a careful analysis of the statute but on a
natural reluctance to upset the results of an election, establishing a
presumption that if applied to the 2000 election deadlock they would
have required deferring to the position taken by the state election officials, who sought to ratify the popular vote. The other two cases
date from 1917 and 1929, respectively. In the earlier case the refusal
to count certain ballots was deemed unlawful because the ballots did
not violate any mandatory provision of the election code,19 and in the
later case an election was set aside because the ballots had been improperly completed by the voter.20
I thus emphatically disagree with Professor Friedman’s contention that the officials’ “interpretation was clearly wrong or at least
unreasonable, and beyond the bounds within which deference was
required.”21 I also disagree that the Florida Supreme “court’s November 21 decision to extend the [canvassing] boards’ deadline had little
impact on its December 8 decision to order a statewide recount.”22
What was critical about the November 21 decision was not the extension but the ruling, carried through to the December 8 decision, that
spoiled ballots must be counted if the voter’s intent is discernible.
Had it not been for that ruling, there would have been no basis for
ordering a statewide recount, since it was only the large number of
spoiled ballots that cast doubt on whether Bush had really won the
popular election.
Professor Friedman expresses doubt as to whether the election
deadlock was even justiciable in the U.S. Supreme Court, given that
the Constitution commits the counting of the electoral votes to Congress without setting forth any standard for how disputes over the
18. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 107 n.29 (the Boardman and Carpenter cases cited
by Friedman, supra note 2, at 848 n.146, plus several other cases not cited by him).
19. Darby v. State ex rel. McCollough, 75 So. 411, 412 (Fla. 1917) (per curiam). Not all
the instructions given voters are intended to state legal requirements. See POSNER, supra
note 3, at 107 n.29. In Darby, a bond referendum case, two voters had marked their “X” to
the right of the proposition to be voted on rather than the left, as the instructions required.
Darby, 75 So. at 412. The votes were counted by hand—this was before machine counting—and there was no rational basis for the rejection of the two ballots in question. The
idea that a decision like Darby (setting its antiquity to one side) would require state election officials to permit the counting of dimpled chads as votes is fanciful.
20. Florida ex rel. Nuccio v. Williams, 120 So. 310, 315 (Fla. 1929) (en banc).
21. Friedman, supra note 2, at 852.
22. Id. at 854.
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validity of electoral votes cast on Electoral College election day are to
be resolved. I agree that a dispute over electoral votes presents a “political question” that the Court should refuse to answer.23 But rather
than showing that the Court should not have agreed to review the
Florida Supreme Court’s decisions in the litigation over the deadlocked Florida election, this point demonstrates the opposite. Once
the dispute landed in Congress on January 6, it would be too late for
judicial intervention to resolve the dispute; that is one of the things
that makes the worst-case scenario plausible. But before the dispute
landed in Congress, when the issue was not how Congress would resolve a dispute over electors but the consistency of the Florida court’s
decisions with the U.S. Constitution, there was no “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.”24 Nowhere does the Constitution suggest that Congress shall resolve disputes over the application of Article II or any
other provision of the Constitution to the selection of a state’s presidential electors, a process that takes place before the electoral votes
are counted. Congress is not “clearly the forum that the Constitution
chose to resolve these disputes.”25
Professor Friedman devotes a fair bit of space to discussing the
likely resolution of the deadlock had a Gore slate been approved by
the Florida Supreme Court by December 12. I believe there is no reasonable possibility that the statewide recount ordered by that court
on December 8 could have been completed in four days with full exhaustion of judicial remedies. And so the dispute would have been
tossed into the lap of Congress after all—there to be resolved, in
Friedman’s words, by “open politics.”26 The intended force of “open” is
unclear. Does it mean naked? Raw? Patently partisan? Or perhaps
democratic? Experience with past presidential elections not resolved
in the orthodox manner, namely 1800 (Jefferson over Burr), 1824
(John Quincy Adams over Jackson), and 1876 (Hayes over Tilden)
suggests that when the President is selected in an unorthodox way
(by the House of Representatives, in the first two examples, and by
an ad hoc commission appointed by Congress, in the third), he comes
into office trailing poison. (The Hamilton-Burr duel may have been a
consequence of the 1800 election foul-up, as Hamilton vigorously
supported Jefferson, his traditional foe, against Burr.27)

23. POSNER, supra note 3, at 184-85.
24. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 215 (1962) (quoted in Friedman, supra note 2, at
859).
25. Contra Friedman, supra note 2, at 868 (“Congress is clearly the forum that the
Constitution chose to resolve these disputes.”).
26. Id. at 867.
27. JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 40-43
(2000).

2001]

REPLY TO FRIEDMAN

877

And finally, I do not think that the Supreme Court’s intervention,
ham-handed though it unquestionably was (for which Gore is to
blame for not having accepted the result of the popular election in
Florida), imposed a significant “cost to democracy.”28 It did damage
the prestige (or, if one prefers, the “credibility”) of the Supreme
Court, but as the Court is not a democratic institution, but a republican check on democratic ardor and abuse, I do not see such damage
as a setback for democracy. I don’t see what other democratic cost
was incurred, unless one doubts, as I do not, that the outcome of the
popular election was an unbreakable statistical tie. The recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court, if carried through to the end,
might have changed the result of the election; it would not have revealed the “true” winner.29 And, on the other side, on the benefit side
of the Court’s intervention, the “order and unity” side that Friedman
mentions briefly, I disagree that dumping the deadlock into Congress
would not have led to “even a delay in inauguration.”30 If Congress
did not resolve the deadlock within two weeks, that is, by January
20, an Acting President would have been appointed—but not, I take
it, inaugurated.

28. Friedman, supra note 2, at 868.
29. POSNER, supra note 3, at 88-90.
30. Friedman, supra note 2, at 868.

